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Abstract—Web query log data contain information useful to 
research; however, release of such data can re-identify the search 
engine users issuing the queries. These privacy concerns go far 
beyond removing explicitly identifying information such as name 
and address, since non-identifying personal data can be combined 
with publicly available information to pinpoint to an individual. 
In this work we model web query logs as unstructured 
transaction data and present a novel transaction anonymization 
technique based on clustering and generalization techniques to 
achieve the k-anonymity privacy. We conduct extensive 
experiments on the AOL query log data. Our results show that 
this method results in a higher data utility compared to the state-
of-the-art transaction anonymization methods. 
 
Index Terms— Query logs data, privacy-preserving data 
publishing, transaction data anonymization, item generalization. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EB search engines generally store query logs data for 
the purpose of improving ranking algorithms, query 
refinement, user modeling, fraud/abuse detection, language-
based applications, and sharing data for academic research or 
commercial needs [4]. On the other hand, the release of query 
logs data can seriously breach the privacy of search engine 
users. The privacy concern goes far beyond just removing the 
identifying information from a query. Sweeney [17] showed 
that even non-identifying personal data can be combined with 
publicly available information, such as census or voter 
registration databases, to pinpoint to an individual. In 2006 the 
America Online (AOL) query logs data, over a period of three 
months, was released to the public [2]. Although all explicit 
identifiers of searchers have been removed, by examining 
query terms, the searcher No. 4417749 was traced back to the 
62-year-old widow Thelma Arnold. Since this scandal, data 
publishers become reluctant to provide researchers with public 
anonymized query logs [7]. 
An important research problem is how to render web query 
log data in such a way that it is difficult to link a query to a 
specific individual while the data is still useful to data analysis. 
Several recent works start to examine this problem, with [10] 
and [1] from web community focusing on privacy attacks,  and 
[8], [18], and [19] from the database community focusing on 
anonymization techniques. Although good progresses are 
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made, a major challenge is reducing the significant information 
loss of the anonymized data.  
The subject of this paper falls into the field of privacy 
preserving data publishing (PPDP) [6], which is different 
from access control and authentication associated with 
computer security. The work in these latter areas ensures that 
the recipient of information has the authority to receive that 
information. While such protections can safeguard against 
direct disclosures, they do not address disclosures based on 
inferences that can be drawn from released data. The subject 
of PPDP is not much on whether the recipient can access to 
the information or not, but is more on what values will 
constitute the information the recipient will receive so that the 
privacy of record owners is protected.  
A. Motivations 
This paper studies the query log anonymization problem 
with the focus on reducing information loss. One approach is 
modeling query logs data as a special case of transaction data, 
where each transaction contains several “items” from an item 
universe I. In the case of query logs, each transaction 
represents a query and each item represents a query term. 
Other examples of transaction data are emails, online clicking 
streams, online shopping transactions, and so on. As pointed 
out in [18] and [19], for transaction data, the item universe I is 
very large (say thousands of items) and a transaction contains 
only a few items. For example, each query contains a tiny 
fraction of all query terms that may occur in a query log. If 
each item is treated as a binary attribute with 1/0 values, the 
transaction data is extremely high dimensional and sparse. On 
such data, traditional techniques suffer from extreme 
information loss [18] and [19]. 
Recently, the authors of [8] adapted the top-down Mondrian 
[12] partition algorithm originally proposed for relational data 
to generalize the set-valued transaction data. We refer to this 
algorithm as Partition in this paper. They adapted the 
traditional k-anonymity [15] and [16] to the set valued 
transaction data. A transaction database is k-anonymous if 
transactions are partitioned into equivalence classes of size at 
least k, where all transactions in the same equivalence class are 
exactly identical. This notion prevents linking attacks in the 
sense that the probability of linking an individual to a specific 
transaction is no more than 1/k.  
Our insight is that Partition method suffers from significant 
information loss on transaction data. Consider the transaction 
data S={ t1, t2, t3, t4, t5 } in the second column of Table I and 
the item taxonomy in Fig. 1. Assume k = 2. Partition works as 
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follows. Initially, there is one partition P{food} in which the 
items in every transaction are generalized to the top-most item 
food. At this point, the possible drill-down is food → {fruit, 
meat, dairy}, yielding 23-1 sub-partitions corresponding to the 
non-empty subsets of {fruit, meat, dairy}, i.e., P{fruit}, P{meat}, 
..., and P{fruit,meat,dairy}, where the curly bracket of each sub-
partition contains the common items for all the transactions in 
that sub-partition. All transactions in P{food} are then partitioned 
into these sub-partitions. All sub-partitions except P{fruit,meat} 
violate k-anonymity (for k=2) and thus are merged into one 
partition P{food}. Further partitioning of P{fruit,meat} also violates k-
anonymity. Therefore, the algorithm stops with the result 
shown in the last column of Table I. 
One drawback of Partition is that it stops partitioning the 
data at a high level of the item taxonomy. Indeed, specializing 
an item with n children will generate 2n-1 possible sub-
partitions. This exponential branching, even for a small value 
of n, quickly diminishes the size of a sub-partition and causes 
violation of k-anonymity. This is especially true for query logs 
data where query terms are drawn from a large universe and 
are from a diverse section of the taxonomy.  
 
 
Fig. 1.  Food taxonomy tree 
 
TABLE I 
The motivating example and its 2-anonymization 
 
TID Original Data Partition 
t1 <orange, chicken, beef> <fruit, meat> 
t2 <banana, beef, cheese> <food> 
t3 <chicken, milk, butter> <food> 
t4 <apple, chicken> <fruit, meat> 
t5 <chicken, beef> <food> 
 
Moreover, the Partition does not deal with item duplication. 
As an example, the generalized t3 in the third column of Table 
I contains only one occurrence of food, which clearly has more 
information loss than the generalized transaction <food, food, 
food> because the latter tells more truthfully that the original 
transaction purchases at least three items. Indeed, the TFIDF 
used by many ranking algorithms critically depends on the 
term frequency of a term in a query or document. Preserving 
the occurrences of items (as much as possible) would enable a 
wide range of data analysis and applications.  
B. Contributions 
To render the input transaction data k-anonymous, our 
observation is: if “similar” transactions are grouped together, 
less generalization and suppression will be needed to render 
them identical. As an example, grouping two transactions 
<Apple> and <Milk> (each having only one item) entails more 
information loss than grouping two transactions <Apple> and 
<Orange>, because the former results in the more generalized 
transaction <Food> whereas the latter results in the less 
generalized transaction <Fruit>. Therefore, with a proper 
notion of transaction similarity, we can treat the transaction 
anonymization as a clustering problem such that each cluster 
must contain at least k transactions and these transactions 
should be “similar”. Our main contributions are as follows: 
Contribution 1 For a given item taxonomy, we introduce 
the notion of the Least Common Generalization (LCG) as the 
generalized representation of a subset of transactions, and as a 
way to measure the similarity of a subset of transactions. The 
distortion of LCG models the information loss caused by both 
item generalization and item suppression. We devise a linear-
time algorithm to compute LCG.  
Contribution 2 We formulate the transaction 
anonymization as the problem of clustering a given set of 
transactions into clusters of size at least k such that the sum of 
LCG distortion of all clusters is minimized.  
Contribution 3 We present a heuristic linear-time solution 
to the transaction anonymization problem. 
Contribution 4 We evaluate our method on the AOL query 
logs data. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes 
problem statements. Section III gives our clustering algorithm. 
Section IV presents the detailed algorithm for computing LCG. 
Section V presents the experimental results. Section VI 
reviews related works. We conclude in Section VII. 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
This section defines our problems. We use the terms 
“transaction” and “item”. In the context of web query logs, a 
transaction corresponds to a query and an item corresponds to 
a query term. 
A. Item Generalization 
We assume that there is a taxonomy tree T over the item 
universe I, with the parent being more general than all 
children. This assumption was made in the literature [15], [16], 
[8], [18]. For example, WordNet [5] could be a source to 
obtain the item taxonomy.  
The process of generalization refers to replacing a special 
item with a more general item (i.e., an ancestor), and the 
process of specialization refers to the exact reverse operation. 
In this work, an item is its own ancestor and descendant. 
Definition 1 (Transactions and generalization) A 
transaction is a bag of items from I (thus allowing duplicate 
items). A transaction t’ is a Generalized Transaction of a 
transaction t, if for every item i’∈t’ there exists one distinct 
item i∈t such that i’ is an ancestor of i. In this case, t is the 
Specialized Transaction of t’.  
The above transaction model is different from [8] in several 
ways. First, it allows duplicate items in a transaction. Second, 
it allows items in a transaction to be on the same path in the 
item taxonomy, in which case, each item represents a distinct 
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leaf item. For example, we interpret the transaction <Fruit, 
Food> as: Fruit represents (the generalization of) a leaf item 
under Fruit and Food represents a leaf item under Food that is 
not represented by Fruit. Also, if t’ is a generalized transaction 
of t, each item i’∈t’ represents one distinct item i∈t. We say 
that an item i∈t is suppressed in t’ if no i’∈t’ represents the 
item i. Hence, our generalization also models item 
suppression.  
Example 1 Consider the taxonomy tree in Fig. 1 and the 
transaction t=<Orange, Beef>. All possible generalized 
transactions of t are <>, <Orange>, <Beef>, <Orange, Beef>, 
<Fruit, Beef>, <Orange, Meat>, <Fruit, Meat>, <Fruit>, 
<Meat>, <Food>, <Orange, Food>, <Food, Beef>, <Fruit, 
Food>, <Food, Meat>, and <Food, Food>. For t’=<Fruit>, 
Fruit represents (the generalization) of some item under the 
category Fruit (i.e., Orange), and Beef is a suppressed item 
since no more item in t’ represents it. For t’=<Food>, Food 
represents one item under Food, therefore, one of Orange and 
Beef in t is suppressed. For t’=<Food, Food>, each occurrence 
of Food represents a different item in t.  
B. Least Common Generalization 
The main idea of transaction anonymization is to build 
groups of identical transactions through generalization. We 
introduce the following notion to capture such generalizations.  
Definition 2 (LCG) The Least Common Generalization of a 
set of transactions S, denoted by LCG(S), is a common 
generalized transaction for all transactions in S, and there is no 
other more special common generalized transaction.  
The following properties follow from the above definition. 
The proof has been omitted due to the space limit. 
Property 1 LCG(S) is unique for a given S.  
Property 2 The length of LCG(S) (i.e. the number of items 
in it) is equal to the length of the shortest transaction in S.  
This property can be ensured by padding the root item to LCG 
if necessary.  
Example 2 Consider the taxonomy tree in Fig. 1. Let S1 = 
{<Orange, Beef>, <Apple, Chicken, Beef>}, LCG(S1) = 
<Fruit, Beef>. LCG(S1) cannot be <Fruit, Meat> since <Fruit, 
Beef> is a more specialized common transaction. For S2 = 
{<Orange, Milk>, <Apple, Cheese, Butter>}, LCG(S2)=<Fruit, 
Dairy>. Dairy represents Milk in the first transaction and 
represents one of Cheese and Butter in the second transaction. 
Thus one of Cheese or Butter is considered as a suppressed 
item. For S3 = {<Orange, Apple>, <Orange, Banana, Milk>, 
<Banana, Apple, Beef>}, LCG(S3)=<Fruit, Fruit>, which 
represents that all three transactions contain at least two items 
under Fruit. Milk and Beef are suppressed items. For S4 = 
{<Orange, Beef>, <Apple, Milk>}, LCG(S4) = <Fruit, Food>, 
where Food represents Beef in the first transaction and Milk in 
the second transaction. Here LCG contains both a parent and a 
child item.  
Various metrics have been proposed in the literature to 
measure the quality of generalized data including 
Classification Metric (CM), Generalized Loss Metric (LM) 
[9], and Discernibility Metric (DM) [3]. We use LM to 
measure item generalization distortion. The similar notion of 
NCP has also been employed for set-valued data [18] and [8]. 
Let M be the total number of leaf nodes in the taxonomy tree 
T, and let Mp be the number of leaf nodes in the subtree rooted 
at a node p. The Loss Metric for an item p, denoted by LM(p), 
is defined as (Mp-1) / (M-1). For the root item p, LM(p) is 1. 
In words, LM captures the degree of generalization of an item 
by the percentage of the leaf items in the domain that are 
indistinguishable from it after the generalization. For example, 
considering taxonomy in Fig. 1, LM(Fruit)=2/7.  
Suppose that we generalize every transaction in a subset of 
transactions S to a common generalized transaction t, and we 
want to measure the distortion of this generalization. Recall 
that every item in t represents one distinct item in each 
transaction in S (Definition 1). Therefore, each item in t 
generalizes exactly |S| items, one from each transaction in S, 
where |S| is the number of transactions in S. The remaining 
items in a transaction (that are not generalized by any item in t) 
are suppressed items. Therefore, the distortion of this 
generalization is the sum of the distortion for generalized 
items, |S|×Σi∈t LM(i), and the distortion for suppressed items. 
For each suppressed item, we charge the same distortion as if 
it is generalized to the root item, i.e., 1.  
Definition 3 (GGD) Suppose that we generalize every 
transaction in a set of transactions S to a common generalized 
transaction t. The Group Generalization Distortion of the 
generalization is defined as GGD(S, t) = |S|×Σi∈t LM(i) + Ns, 
where Ns is the number of occurrences of suppressed items. 
To minimize the distortion, we shall generalize S to the least 
common generalization LCG(S), which has the distortion 
GGD(S, LCG(S)). 
Example 3 Consider the taxonomy in Fig. 1 and 
S1={<Orange, Beef>, <Apple, Chicken, Beef>}. We have 
LCG(S1) = <Fruit, Beef>. LM(Fruit)=2/7, LM(Beef)=0, and 
|S1|=2. Since Chicken is the only suppressed item, Ns=1. Thus 
GGD(S1, LCG(S1)) = 2×(2/7+0) + 1 = 11/7.       
C. Problem Definition 
We adopt the transactional k-anonymity in [8] as our 
privacy notion. A transaction database D is k-anonymous if for 
every transaction in D, there are at least k-1 other identical 
transactions in D. Therefore, for a k-anonymous D, if one 
transaction is linked to an individual, so are at least k-1 other 
transactions, so the adversary has at most 1/k probability to 
link a specific transaction to the individual. For example, the 
last column in Table I is a 2-anonymous transaction database. 
Definition 4 (Transaction anonymization) Given a 
transaction database D, a taxonomy of items, and a privacy 
parameter k, we want to find the clustering C={S1,…,Sn} of D 
such that S1,…,Sn are pair-wise disjoint subsets of D with each 
Si containing at least k transactions from D, and Σ i=1..|C| 
GGD(Si, LCG(Si)) is minimized.  
Let C={S1,…,Sn} be a solution to the above anonymization 
problem. A k-anonymized database of D can be obtained by 
generalizing every transaction in Si to LCG(Si), i=1,…,n. 
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III. CLUSTERING APPROACH 
In this section we present our algorithm Clump for solving 
the problem defined in Definition 4. In general, the problem of 
finding optimal k-anonymization is NP-hard for k≥3 [13]. 
Thus, we focus on an efficient heuristic solution to this 
problem and evaluate its effectiveness empirically. In this 
section, we assume that the functions LCG(S) and GGD(S, 
LCG(S)) are given. We will discuss the detail of computing 
these functions in Section IV. 
The central idea of our algorithm is to group transactions in 
order to reduce ΣGGD(Si, LCG(Si)), subject to the constraint 
that Si contains at least k transactions. Recall GGD(S, LCG(S)) 
= |S|×Σi∈LCG(S) LM(i) + Ns and from Property 2, LCG(S) has the 
length equal to the minimum length of transactions in S. All 
“extra” items in a transaction that do not have a generalization 
in LCG(S) are suppressed and contributes to the suppression 
distortion Ns. Since the distortion of generalizing an item is no 
more than the distortion of suppressing an item, one heuristic 
is to group transactions of similar length into one cluster in 
order to minimize the suppression distortion Ns.  
Based on this idea, we present our algorithm Clump. Let D 
be the input transaction database and let n=|D|/k be the 
number of clusters, where |D| denotes the number of 
transactions in D: 
Step 1 (line 2-5): We arrange the transactions in D in the 
decreasing order of the transaction length, and we initialize the 
ith cluster Si, i=1,…,n, with the transaction at the position (i-
1)k+1 in the ordered list. Since earlier transactions in the 
arranged order have longer length, earlier clusters in this order 
tend to contain longer transactions. 
For the comparison purpose, we also implement other 
transaction assignment orders, such as random assignment 
order and the increasing transaction length order (i.e., the 
exact reverse order of the above algorithm). Our experiments 
found that the decreasing order by transaction length produced 
better results. 
Step 2 (line 6-12): For each remaining transaction ti in the 
arranged order, we assign ti to the cluster Sj such that |Sj|<k and 
GGD(Sj∪{ti}, LCG(Sj∪{ti})) is minimized. Since this step 
requires computing GGD(Sj∪{ti}, LCG(Sj∪{ti})), we can 
restrict the search to the first r clusters Sj with |Sj|<k, where r is 
a pruning parameter. Our order of examining transactions 
implies that longer transactions tend to be assigned to earlier 
clusters.   
Step 3 (line 13-17): after all of the n clusters contain k 
number of transactions, for each remaining transaction ti in the 
sorted order, we assign it to the cluster Sj with the minimum 
GGD(Sj∪{ti}, LCG(Sj∪{ti})). 
The major work of the algorithm is computing 
GGD(Sj∪{ti}, LCG(Sj∪{ti})), which requires the 
LCG(Sj∪{ti}). We will present an algorithm for computing 
LCG(Si) in time O(|T|×|Si|) in the next section, where |T| is the 
size of the taxonomy tree T and |Si| is the number of 
transactions in Si. It is important to note that each cluster Si has 
a size at most 2k. Since k is small, LCG can be computed 
efficiently. In fact, the next lemma says that LCG(Sj∪{ti}) can 
be computed incrementally from LCG(Sj). 
 
Algorithm 1 Clump: Transaction Clustering 
Input: Transaction database: D, Taxonomy: T, Anonymity 
parameter: k, n=|D|/k
 
Output: k-anonymous transaction database: D* 
Method: 
1. Initialize Si ←∅ for i=1,...,|D|; 
2. Sort the transactions in D in the descending order of 
length 
3. for i = 1 to n do 
4.      assign the transaction at the position (i-1)k+1 to Si  
5. end for 
6. while |Sj|<k for some Sj do 
7.    for each unassigned transaction ti in sorted order do 
8.         Let Sj be the cluster such that |Sj|<k and   
                      GGD(Sj∪{ti},LCG(Sj∪{ti})) is minimized  
9.         LCG(Sj) ← LCG(Sj∪{ti}) 
10.         Sj ← Sj∪{ti} 
11.    end for 
12. end while 
13. for each unassigned transaction ti do 
14.      Let Sj be the cluster such 
                  GGD(Sj∪{ti},LCG(Sj∪{ti})) is minimized  
15.      LCG(Sj) ← LCG(Sj∪{ti}) 
16.      Sj ← Sj∪{ti} 
17. end for 
18. return LCG(Si) and Si, i=1,..., n 
 
Lemma 1 Let t be a transaction, S be a subset of 
transactions, and S’={LCG(S),t} consist of two transactions. 
Then LCG(S∪{t}) =LCG(S’). 
Proof: Omitted due to the space limit.  
In words, the lemma says that the LCG of Sj∪{ti} is equal to 
the LCG of two transactions, LCG(S) and ti. Thus if we 
maintain LCG(Sj) for each cluster Sj, the computation of 
LCG(Sj∪{t}) involves only two transactions and takes the time 
O(|T|). 
Theorem 1 For a database D and a taxonomy tree T, 
Algorithm 1 runs in time O(|D|×r×|T|), where r is the pruning 
parameter used by the algorithm. 
Proof: We apply Counting Sort which takes O(|D|) time to 
sort all transactions in D by their length. Subsequently, the 
algorithm examines each transaction once to insert it to a 
cluster. To insert a transaction ti, the algorithm examines r 
clusters and, for each cluster Sj, it computes LCG(Sj∪{ti}) and 
GGD(Sj∪{ti}, LCG(Sj∪{ti})), which takes O(|T|×|Sj|) 
according to Theorem 2 in Section IV, where |Sj| is the number 
of transactions in Sj. With the incremental computing of 
LCG(Sj∪{ti}) in Lemma 1, computing LCG(Sj∪{ti}) takes 
time proportional to |T|. Overall, the algorithm is in 
O(|D|×r×|T|).   
Since |T| and r are constants, the algorithm takes a linear 
time in the database size |D|. 
 5 
IV. COMPUTING LCG 
In the previous section, we make use of the functions 
LCG(S) and GGD(S, LCG(S)) to determine the cluster for a 
transaction. Since these functions are frequently called, an 
efficient implementation is crucial. In this section, we present a 
linear time algorithm for computing LCG and GGD. We focus 
on LCG because computing GGD is straightforward once LCG 
is found. 
A.  Bottom-Up Generalization 
We present a bottom-up item generalization (BUIG) 
algorithm to build LCG(S) for a set S of transactions. First, we 
initialize LCG(S) with the empty set of items. Then, we 
examine the items in the taxonomy tree T in the bottom-up 
fashion: examine a parent only after examining all its children. 
For the current item i examined, if i is an ancestor of some 
item in every transaction in S, we add i to LCG(S). In this case, 
i is the least common generalization of these items. If i is not 
an ancestor of any item in some transaction in S, we need to 
examine the parent of i.  
This algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. Let S= 
<t1,…,tm>. For an item i, we use an array Ri[1..m] to store the 
number of items in a transaction of which i is an ancestor. 
Specifically, Ri[j] is set to the number of items in the 
transaction tj of which i is an ancestor. MinCount(Ri) returns 
the minimum entry in Ri, i.e., minj=1..m Ri[j]. If 
MinCount(Ri)>0, i is an ancestor of at least MinCount(Ri) 
distinct items in every transaction in S, so we will add 
MinCount(Ri) copies of  the item i to LCG(S).  
Algorithm 2 is a call to the recursive procedure BUIG(root) 
with the root of T. Line 1-6 in the main procedure initializes 
LCG and Ri. Consider BUIG(i) for an item i. If i is a leaf in T, 
it returns. Otherwise, line 4-9 examines recursively the 
children i’ of i, by the call BUIG(i’). On return from BUIG(i’), 
if MinCount(Ri’)>0, i’ is an ancestor of at least MinCount(Ri’) 
items in every transaction in S, so MinCount(Ri’) copies of i’ 
are added to LCG. If MinCount(Ri’)=0, i’ does not represent 
any item for some transaction in S, so the examination moves 
up to the parent item i; in this case, line 8 computes Ri by 
aggregating Ri’ for all child items i’ such that MinCount(Ri’)=0. 
Note that, by not aggregating Ri’ with  MinCount(Ri’)>0, we 
stop generalizing such child items. If i is the root, line 10-11 
adds MinTranSize(S)-|LCG| copies of the root item to LCG, 
where MinTranSize(S) returns the minimum transaction length 
of S. This step ensures that LCG has the same length as the 
minimum transaction length of S (Property 2). 
Example 5 Let S={<Orange, Apple>, <Orange, Banana, 
Milk>, <Banana, Apple, Beef>} and consider the taxonomy in 
Fig. 1. BUIG(Food) recurs until reaching leaf items. Then the 
processing proceeds bottom-up as depicted in Fig. 2.   Next to 
each item i, we show o:Ri, where o is the sequence order in 
which i is examined and Ri stores the number of items in each 
transaction of which i is an ancestor. 
The first three items examined are Apple, Orange, and 
Banana. RApple = [1,0,1] (since Apple appeared in transactions 
1 and 3), ROrange=[1,1,0], and RBanana=[0,1,1]. MinCount(Ri)=0 
for these  items i. Next, the parent Fruit is examined and   
RFruit = RApple + ROrange+ RBanana=[2,2,2]. With MinCount(RFruit) 
= 2, two copies of Fruit are added to LCG, i.e., 
LCG(S)=<Fruit, Fruit> and we stop generalizing Fruit.  
 
Fig. 2.  BUIG’s processing order 
 
A similar processing applies to the sub-trees at Meat and 
Dairy, but no item i is added to LCG because MinCount(Ri)=0. 
Finally, at the root Food, RFood = RMeat + RDairy = [0,1,1]. Note 
that we do not add RFruit because MinCount(RFruit)>2, which 
signals that the generalization has stopped at Fruit. Since 
|LCG|=MinTranSize(S), no Food is added to LCG. So the final 
LCG(S)=<Fruit, Fruit>. As mentioned in Example 2, the two 
occurrences of Fruit indicate that all three transactions contain 
at least two items under Fruit.  
 
Algorithm 2 Bottom-up Item Generalization 
Input: Taxonomy: T, Set of m transactions: S = <t1, ..., tm> 
Output: LCG(S) 
Method:
 
1. LCG ← ∅; 
2. for each item i∈T do  
3.      for each tj∈S do 
4.           if tj contains i then Ri[j] ←1 else Ri[j] ←0 
5.      end for 
6. end for 
7. BUIG(root); 
8. return LCG; 
**** 
BUIG(i): 
1. if i is a leaf in T then  
2.      return 
3. else  
4.      for each child i’ of i do 
5.           BUIG(i’); 
6.           if MinCount(Ri’)>0 then 
7.                Add MinCount(Ri’) copies of i’ to LCG 
8.           else Ri ← Ri+Ri’    /* examining the parent i */ 
9.           end for 
10.      if i=root then  
11.           Add  MinTranSize(S)-|LCG| copies of root to LCG  
12. return 
 
Theorem 2 Given a set of transactions S and a taxonomy 
tree T of items, BUIG produces LCG(S) and takes time 
O(|T|×|S|), where |S| is the number of transactions in S and |T| is 
the number of items in taxonomy tree T. 
Proof: First, BUIG generalizes transactions by examining 
the items in T in the bottom-up order and stops generalization 
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whenever encountering an item that is a common ancestor of 
some unrepresented item in every transaction in S. This 
property ensures that each item added to LCD is the earliest 
possible common ancestor of some unrepresented item in 
every transaction. Second, BUIG visits each node in T once, 
and at each node i, it examines the structures Ri’ and Rj of size 
|S|, where i’ is a child of i. So the complexity is O(|T|×|S|).  
B. A Complete Example 
Let us illustrate the complete run of Clump using the 
motivating example in Section I.A. We reproduce the five 
transactions t1 to t5 in Table II, arranged by the descending 
order of transaction length. Let k=2. First, the number of 
clusters is m = 5/2 = 2, and the first cluster S1 is initialized to 
the first transaction t1 and the second cluster S2 is initialized to 
the third transaction t3. Next, we assign the remaining 
transactions t2, t4, and t5 in that order. Consider t2. If we assign 
t2 to S1, LCG(S1∪{t2})={fruit,beef,food}, and GGD = 
2×(2/7+0+1) = 2.57. If we assign t2 to S2,  we have 
LCG(S2∪{t2})={meat,dairy,food} and GGD = 2×(1/7+2/7+1) 
= 2.85. Thus the decision is assigning t2 to S1 resulting in 
S1={t1,t2} and LCG(S1)={fruit, beef, food}.  
Next, we assign t4 to S2 because S1 has contained k=2 
transactions. So S2={t3, t4} and LCG(S2)= <chicken,food>. 
Next, we have the choice of assigning t5 to S1 or S2 because 
both have contained 2 transactions. The decision is assigning t5 
to S2 because it results in a smaller GGD, and LCG(S2)= 
<chicken,food>. So the final clustering is S1={t1, t2} and 
S2={t3, t4, t5}. The last column of Table II shows the final 
generalized transactions. 
Table II  
The motivating example and its 2-anonymization 
 
ID Original Data Partition Clump 
t1 <orange,chicken,beef> <fruit,meat> <fruit,beef,food> 
t2 <banana,beef,cheese> <food> <fruit,beef,food> 
t3 <chicken,milk,butter> <food> <chicken,food> 
t4 <apple,chicken> <fruit,meat> <chicken,food> 
t5 <chicken,beef> <food> <chicken,food> 
 
Let us compare this result of Clump with the result of 
Partition in the third column (which has been derived in 
Section I.A). For Clump, we measure the distortion by 
ΣGGD(Si, LCG(Si)) over all clusters Si. For Partition, we 
measure the distortion by ΣGGD(Si, tj) over all sub-partitions 
Si where tj is the generalized transaction for Si. The GGD for 
Clump is 2×(2/7+0+1) + [3×(0+1)+1] = 6.57, compared to 
[2×(2/7+1/7)+1] + [3×(1)+5] = 8.85 for the Partition.   
V. EXPERIMENTS 
We now evaluate our approach using the real AOL query 
logs [14]. We compared our method Clump with the state-of-
the-art transaction anonymization method Partition [8]. The 
implementation of both algorithms was done in Visual C++ 
and the experiments were performed on a system with core-2 
Duo 2.99GHz CPU with 3.83 GB memory. 
1)  Experiment Setup 
Dataset information The AOL query log collection dataset 
consists of 20M web queries collected from 650k users over 
three months in form of {AnonID, QueryContent, QueryTime, 
ItemRank, ClickURL} and are sorted by anonymous AnonID 
(user ID). Our experiments focused on anonymizing 
QueryContent. The dataset has a size of 2.2GB and is divided 
into 10 subsets, each of which has similar characteristics and 
size. In our experiment, we used the first subset. In addition, 
we merged the queries issued by the same AnonID  into one 
transaction because each query is too short, and removed 
duplicate items, resulting in 53,058 queries or transactions 
with the average transaction length of 20.93. 
We generated the item taxonomy T using the WordNet 
dictionary [5]. According to the WordNet, each noun has 
multiple senses. A sense is represented by a synset, i.e., a set 
of words with the same meaning. We used the first word to 
represent a synset. In pre-processing the AOL dataset, we 
discarded words that are not in the WordNet dictionary. We 
treated each noun as an item and interpreted each noun by its 
most frequently used sense i.e., the first synset. Therefore, 
nouns together with the is-a-kind-of links among them 
comprise a tree. The generated taxonomy tree contains 25645 
items and has the height 18. 
We investigate the following four quality indicators: a) 
distortion (i.e., information loss), b) average generalized 
transaction length, which reflects the number of items 
suppressed, c) average level of generalized items (with the root 
at level 1), and d) execution time. The distortion is measured 
by ΣGGD(Si, LCG(Si)) over the clusters Si for Clump, and by 
ΣGGD(Si, tj) over the sub-partitions Si for Partition where tj is 
the generalized transaction. 
Parameters The first parameter is the anonymity parameter 
k. We set k to 5, 7, 10, and 15. Another parameter is the 
database size |D| (i.e., the number of transactions). In our 
experiments, we used the first 1000, 10000, and 53,058 
transactions to evaluate the runtime and the effect of 
“transaction density” on our algorithm performance. The 
transaction density is measured by the ratio Ntotal / (|D|×|L|), 
where Ntotal is the sum of number of items in all transactions, 
|D| is the number of transactions, and |L| is the number of leaf 
items in our taxonomy. |D|×|L| is the maximum possible 
number of items that can occur in |D| transactions. Table III 
shows the density of the first |D| transactions. Clearly, a 
database gets sparser as |D| grows. Unless otherwise stated, we 
set the parameter r=10 (a parameter used by Clump). 
Table III  
Transaction database density  
|D| 1,000 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 53,058 
Density 0.28% 0.25% 0.20% 0.16% 0.14% 0.11% 
2)  Results 
As discussed in Section I.A, one of our goals is to preserve 
duplicate items after generalization because duplication of 
items tells some information about the number of items in an 
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original transaction, which is useful to data analysis. To study 
the effectiveness of achieving this goal, we consider two 
versions of the result produced by Clump, denoted by Clump1 
and Clump2. Clump1 represents the result produced by Clump 
as discussed in Section IV, thus, preserves duplicate items in 
LCG. Clump2 represents the result after removing all duplicate 
items from LCG.  
Figures 3, 4, 5 show the results with respect to information 
loss, average transaction length, and average level of 
generalized items. Below, we discuss each in details. 
Information loss Fig. 3 clearly shows that the information 
loss is reduced by the proposed Clump compared with 
Partition. The reduction is as much as 30%. As we shall see 
shortly, this reduction comes from the lower generalization 
level of the generalized items in LCG, which comes from the 
effectiveness of grouping similar transactions in our clustering 
algorithm. However, the difference between Clump1 and 
Clump2 is very small.  
A close look reveals that many duplicate items preserved by 
Clump1 are at a high level of the taxonomy tree. For such 
items, generalization has a GGD close to that of suppressing 
an item. However, this does not mean that such duplicate items 
carry no information. Indeed, duplicates of items tell some 
information about the quantity or frequency of an item in an 
original transaction. Such information is not modeled by the 
GGD metric. 
As the database gets larger, the data gets sparser; the 
improvement of Clump over Partition gets smaller. In fact, 
when data is too sparse, no algorithm is expected to perform 
well. As the privacy parameter k increases, the improvement 
reduces. This is because each cluster contains more 
transactions, possibly of different lengths; therefore, more 
generalization and more suppression are required for the LCG 
of such clusters. Typically, k in the range of [5,10] would 
provide adequate protection. 
Average generalized transaction length Fig. 4 shows the 
average length of generalized transactions. Clump1 has 
significantly larger length than Clump2 and Partition. This 
longer transaction length is mainly the consequence of 
preserving duplicate items in LCG by Clump1. As discussed 
above, duplicate items carry useful information about the 
quantity or frequency of items in an original transaction. The 
proposed Clump preserves better such information than 
Partition.   
Average level of generalized items Fig. 5 shows that the 
average level of generalized items for Clump2 is lower than 
that for Partition which is lower than that for Clump1 (recall 
that the root item is at level 1). This is due to the fact that 
many duplicate items preserved by Clump1 are at a level close 
to the root. When such duplicates are removed (i.e., Clump2), 
the remaining items have a lower average level than Partition. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of information loss 
 
Fig. 4. Comparison of average generalized transaction length 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of average level of generalized item 
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Fig. 6. Effect of r on Clump1 
 
Fig. 7. Comparison of running time 
Sensitivity to the parameter r This is the number of top 
clusters examined for assigning each transaction. A larger r 
means that more clusters will be examined to assign a 
transaction, thus, a better local optimal cluster but a longer 
runtime. In this experiment, we set |D|=53,058 and k=5. As 
shown in Fig. 6, we set r to 5, 10, 30, 50, and 100. This 
experiment shows that a larger r does not always give a better 
result since Clump works in a greedy manner and by 
increasing the number of clusters to examine, we may come up 
with a locally optimal choice that later increases the overall 
information loss. Our experiments show that setting r=10 
achieves a good result.  
Runtime Fig. 7 depicts the runtime comparison for k=5 and 
r=10. Clump takes longer time than Partition does. In fact, the 
small runtime of Partition is largely due to the fact that the 
top-down algorithm stops partitioning the data at a high level 
of the taxonomy because a sub-partition contains less than k 
transactions.  Thus, this small runtime is in fact at the costly 
information loss. Clump takes a longer runtime but is still 
linearly scalable with respect to the data size. Considering the 
notably less information loss, the longer runtime of Clump is 
justified. 
VI. RELATED WORK 
A recent survey [4] discussed seven query log privacy-
enhancing techniques from a policy perspective, including 
deleting entire query logs, hashing query log content, deleting 
user identifiers, scrubbing personal information from query 
content, hashing user identifiers, shortening sessions, and 
deleting infrequent queries. Although these techniques protect 
privacy to some extent, there is a lack of formal privacy 
guarantees. For example, the release of the AOL query log 
data still leads to the re-identification of a search engine user 
even after hashing user’s identifiers [2]. The challenge is that 
the query content itself may be used together with publicly 
available information for linking attacks. 
In token based hashing [10] a query log is anonymized by 
tokenizing each query term and securely hashing each token to 
an identifier. However, if an unanonymized reference query 
log has been released previously, the adversary could employ 
the reference query log to extract statistical properties of query 
terms in the log and then processes the anonymized log to 
invert the hash function based on co-occurrences of tokens 
within queries. 
Secret sharing [1] is another method which splits a query 
into k random shares and publishes a new share for each 
distinct user issuing the same query. This technique guarantees 
k-anonymity because each share is useless on its own and all 
the k shares are required to decode the secret. This means that 
a query can be decoded only when there are at least k users 
issuing that query. The result is equivalent to suppressing all 
queries issued by less than k users. Since queries are typically 
sparse, many queries will be suppressed as a result.  
Split personality, also proposed in [1], splits the logs of 
each user on the basis of “interests” so that the users become 
dissimilar to themselves, thus reducing the possibility of 
reconstructing a full user trace (i.e. search history of a user). 
This distortion also makes it more difficult for researchers to 
correlate different facets. 
The work on transaction anonymization is studied in the 
database and data mining communities. Other than the 
Partition algorithm [8] we discussed in Section I.A, some 
techniques such as (h; k; p)-coherence [19], using suppression 
technique, and km-anonymity [18], using generalization, have 
been proposed. Both works assume that a realistic adversary is 
limited by a maximum number of item occurrences that can be 
acquired as background knowledge. As pointed out in [8], if 
background knowledge can be on the absence of items, the 
adversary may exclude transactions using this knowledge and 
focus on fewer than k transactions. The k-anonymity avoids 
this problem because all transactions in the same equivalence 
class are identical.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The objective of publishing query logs for research is 
constrained by privacy concerns and it is a challenging 
problem to achieve a good tradeoff between privacy and utility 
of query log data. In this paper, we proposed a novel solution 
to this problem by casting it as a special clustering problem 
and generalizing all transactions in each cluster to their least 
common generalization (LCG). The goal of clustering is to 
group transactions into clusters so that the overall distortion is 
minimized and each cluster has at least the size k.  
We devised efficient algorithms to find a good clustering. 
Our studies showed that the proposed algorithm retains a 
better data utility in terms of less data generalization and 
preserving more items, compared to the state-of-the-art 
transaction anonymization approaches.  
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